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Abstract 
In a market-oriented economy like the U.S., the process of monitoring through lending 
mitigates lenders’ demand for accounting conservatism. Japanese corporate governance is 
characterized as a bank-dominated or relationship-oriented system. Under bank-dominated 
systems, main banks are expected to be effective monitors. In our model, main banks play the 
role of reducing the lenders’ demand for accounting conservatism by reducing information 
asymmetry. We find that main banks can reduce the demand for accounting conservatism. 
Our findings help understand accounting conservatism vis-à-vis agency problems. We 
provide empirical evidence to contribute to literature on banking, specifically to fields such as 
relationship banking. 
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Conservatism accounting presents an asymmetric timeline of earnings from a higher 
degree of verification to recognize good news as accounting gain than bad news as loss 
(Basu, 1997). From the perspective of the agency theory, shareholders have an incentive to 
appropriate wealth from debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). There are two key drivers 
of conservatism: agency costs and information asymmetry (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). A 
major source of demand for accounting conservatism arises from debt contracts (Watts, 
2003a). However, accounting conservatism cannot fully solve the agency problems related to 
debt contracts (Erkens et al., 2014). Asymmetric information matters in the occurrence of 
severe agency problems. Previous literature on corporate governance conceptualizes that 
monitoring roles of corporate governance systems are differently characterized under 
different institutional settings (Aguilera et al., 2015). Thus, large U.S. firms are not 
necessarily effective in different corporate governance settings as bank-dominated corporate 
governance endeavors in Japan are. In this paper, we analyze whether main banks, an 
insensitive form of relationship banking, can moderate accounting conservatism. 
There remains a research question of whether or not features of corporate governance or 
financial systems affect accounting conservatism stemming from agency conflicts, or 
asymmetric information under bank center economy, even if their effective monitoring can 
mitigate agency problems. We hypothesize that the Japanese main bank system can moderate 
the demand for accounting conservatism. As Aoki et al. (1994) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) mentioned, market-oriented economies like the U.S. and the U.K. are different from 
bank-oriented economies like Japan. In a market-oriented economy, corporate governance 
systems essentially have strong legal protection for minority shareholders and monitoring 
roles of institutional investors. Accounting conservatism is especially demanded in firms with 
higher degrees of information asymmetry for their institutional investors (LaFond and 
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Roychowdhury, 2008; Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). In a bank-oriented economy, main 
banks are expected to be effective monitors (Aoki, 1990; Sheard, 1994). Main banks are not 
only the largest lenders, but also have large shareholdings to maintain long-term relationships 
with their client firms (Aoki et al., 1994). These positions of main banks might enable them 
to monitor other stakeholders. 
Lenders favor accounting conservatism because they enjoy its benefits in keeping with 
the positive accounting theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). In the context of debt 
contracts, lenders are more interested in assuring the minimum amounts of net assets in 
borrowing firms to avoid problems pertaining to limited liability. Accordingly, they demand 
conservative accounting. This is because lenders cannot receive any additional wealth when a 
borrowing firm’s net assets are above the face value of the debt (Watts, 2003a). The benefits 
of accounting conservatism to lenders have been summarized in several studies (Ahmed et 
al., 2002; Zhang, 2008). Firstly, conservatism improves the borrowers’ debt ratings, and firms 
under severe debtholder-shareholder conflict tend to adopt more conservative accounting 
(Ahmed et al., 2002). Second, conservative financial reports are likely to trigger debt 
covenant violations. These accelerated covenant violations on the part of borrowers provide a 
chance for lenders to mitigate their downside risk in advance. Thus, conservatism of 
borrowers plays a role in signaling for lenders (Zhang, 2008). 
However, no previous study has examined the relationship between the main bank and 
conservative accounting. We speculate that main banks do play a substitute role of signaling 
for other lenders instead of conservatism accounting of borrowers. Even in the U.S., lenders 
have to play an effective monitoring role in mitigating information asymmetry by using 
conservative accounting (Erkens et al., 2014). On the other hand, Japanese main banks have 
positions as both lenders and shareholders. Therefore, main banks are less likely to face an 
asymmetric downside risk, when compared to commercial banks in the U.S. In addition, main 
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banks can gather private information on borrowers using the relationship banking technique 
(Aoki et al., 1994). Main bank systems are regarded as “a particular intense and close form of 
relationship banking” (Patrick, 1994). As a result, firms with main bank relationships might 
not face severe agency problems. 
There is an additional empirical question to reveal the difference in delegated monitors 
between main banks and other banks having lending relationships with their client firms. This 
study focuses on the potential differences between main banks and other banks with lending 
ties alone. Japanese banks can gather private information on client firms through the lending 
relationship using “relational debt” (David et al., 2008; O’Brien et al., 2014). By using 
techniques of relationship lending, banks can gather detailed information on their client firms 
(Boot, 2000). As for relationships between lenders and borrowers, effective monitoring, such 
as relationship banking, can help mitigate the risk of lenders who may face their borrowers’ 
limited liability problems. 
In this paper, we examine conservative models similar to those of Erkens et al. (2014) 
to reveal an answer to this empirical question. The results of our paper are summarized as 
follows. First, we find that firms with main bank relationships have lower asymmetric 
timelines than firms without main bank relationships. Our finding implies that main banks 
would not demand accounting conservatism from the perspective of both lenders and 
effective shareholders. We can interpret that main banks can substitute the role of 
conservative accounting because they take on the role of delegated monitors. Second, we also 
investigate whether commercial banks, which only hold the position of lenders, demand 
accounting conservatism or not. We check the robustness to examine the analysis of restricted 
sample firms which have lending relationships. This suggests that commercial banks do not 
depend on private information through relational debt contracts. 
This paper contributes to the literature on conservatism accounting and banking. First, 
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this study analyzes the relationship between accounting conservatism and the main bank, to 
reveal who demands earlier recognition of loss value. Our findings show that the main bank 
system can significantly moderate accounting conservatism. Second, we also provide 
empirical evidence to contribute to banking literature, particularly to fields such as 
relationship banking. Our study is the first to reveal the role of main banks in relation to 
accounting conservatism. Our findings also reveal that only lending by banks does not affect 
management decisions of accounting conservatism. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. We then introduce our sample and discuss our estimation method. 
We then present our empirical results and additional analysis in the section that follows. 
Finally, we discuss and conclude the paper. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
Conservatism, Information Asymmetry, and Agency Problem 
Accounting conservatism, in principle, functions so as to mitigate information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. From the perspective of the agency theory, there 
are conflicts between shareholders and managers under separation of ownership and 
management in publicly listed companies. To mitigate potential conflicts among shareholders 
and managers, corporate governance is an important system that affects managerial decision 
making (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency costs arising from information asymmetry are 
incurred by both shareholders and lenders of a firm. 
There are two types of financial systems, namely, the Anglo-American model and the 
bank-based model (Aoki et al., 1994). The former is based on transaction finance, in that the 
security market plays an important role in financing. Thus, it is regarded as market-based 
finance, or capital market finance. The latter model depends on relationship finance that is 
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constructed by repeated lending and close relationships between banks and clients. Previous 
studies on bank lending focus on the different roles of “relational debt” (also called “private 
loan”) and “transaction debt” (also called “market securities”; Boot, 2000; David et al., 2008; 
O’Brien et al., 2014). In financial systems, excluding the U.S., commercial banks play an 
important role as sources of finance for not only small and medium enterprises, but also for 
large listed firms (Patrick, 1994). 
As for the relationship between the agency problem and accounting conservatism, 
institutional shareholders demand conservatism in dispersed ownership countries 1 
(Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012). In the U.S., institutional investors demand accounting 
conservatism in firms with higher degrees of information asymmetry. Accounting 
conservatism is highly investigated in firms where the separation of ownership and 
management is more pronounced (LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008). In addition, 
conservative reporting occurs in firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry 
(Lafond and Watts, 2008). Greater institutional shareholdings are positively associated with 
conservative reporting in firms with higher information asymmetry (Ramalingegowda and 
Yu, 2012). 
As lenders have incentives for minimizing agency cost by the late loss recognition of 
borrowing firms, they demand accounting conservatism. Debt contracts would also mitigate 
agency problems arising from debt relationships by transferring control rights from borrowers 
to lenders during bad conditions, through covenant violations (Black and Cox, 1976; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). As a result, accounting conservatism has been adopted to facilitate debt 
                                                 
1 In family firms, Chen et al. (2014) show that conservative accounting is pronounced by 
founding CEO ownership because they have the incentive to reduce risk of potential litigation 
and agency costs consistent with Watts (2003a; 2003b). These studies imply that the one who 
demands conservatism might depend on the difference in the corporate ownership structure. 
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contracts by triggering covenant violations through the recognition of accelerated loss (Watts, 
2003a; Ball et al., 2008). 
While debt contracting would be a driver of accounting conservatism, debt contracts 
cannot fully solve agency problems. Effective monitoring by lenders can moderate and solve 
agency problems between lenders and borrowers. Banks can gather detailed information on 
client firms by adopting relationship lending (Boot, 2000). In the U.S., relationship lending 
would help mitigate information asymmetry and substitute for the role of conservatism 
accounting (Erkens et al., 2014). 
 
Japanese Corporate Governance and Main Bank System 
Corporate governance in Japan is a bank-centered system, which is different from the 
market-oriented system in the U.S. One of the features of bank-centered systems is that banks 
play the role of main capital suppliers for firms (Biddle and Hilary, 2006). The other feature 
is a close relationship between bank and client firms through lending relationships (Aoki, 
1990; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). Japanese main banks are defined as banks that lend the 
largest share of loans to client firms, and this is based on long-term relationships between the 
banks and the firms (Aoki et al., 1994). We introduce literature on Japanese corporate finance 
and several functions of the close relationship between them. 
Main banks play an important role in monitoring their client firms and helping reduce 
principal-agency problems (Aoki, 1990). As Aoki et al. (1994) and Weistein and Yafeh 
(1998) mentioned, main banks are regarded as “delegated monitors” which is theoretically 
advocated by Diamond (1984). Bank lending or “relational debt” has a strong influence on 
management decisions such as R&D investment (David et al., 2008). The turnover of top 
executives in a firm with bank relationships tend to be prompted, which is regarded as a 
disciplinary mechanism for executives (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). As for executive 
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compensation, executive incentive tends to be provided for firms with higher bank ownership 
(Sakawa et al., 2012). Thus, there might be a possibility that their information gathered 
through the monitoring activity is not necessarily restricted by financial reporting, but is also 
affected by the need to construct effective incentive compensation structures for their client 
firms. 
Main banks do not bear the impact of severe conflicts that take place between 
shareholders and lenders. Debt holders have an asymmetric payoff related to net assets. This 
asymmetric payoff is problematic when borrowers face distress. Main banks are not only the 
largest lenders for client firms, but are also lenders for the large equity owners of the firms 
(Morck et al., 2000; Sakawa and Watanabel, 2014). Main banks may have the chance of 
acquiring additional payments, such as dividends, when projects of borrowing firms produce 
higher earnings. Therefore, main banks do not have incentive to transform wealth from 
lenders to shareholders because they are major shareholders of client firms (Prowse, 1990). 
Main banks do not face severe problems as a result of information asymmetry 
between themselves and their client firms. At first, the equity ownership of main banks is 
regarded as a devise of the banks’ commitment to their clients, to maintain their long-term 
relationships (Aoki et al., 1994). In Japan, firms which have relationship with a bank do not 
face severe liquidity problems when the firms make decisions on their investment (Hoshi et 
al., 1990; Hoshi et al., 1991). Even in the U.S., small firms with close ties to banks are able to 
access capital (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Therefore, these long-term relationships are 
regarded as an important function of reducing asymmetric information problems between the 
main banks and their clients (Weistein and Yafeh, 1998). 
Second, the main bank can gather private information in detail not only through 
lending activities but also through settlements accounting of their clients. Main banks have an 
information advantage vis-à-vis their client firms over other lending banks. Firms need to 
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manage cash flow transactions, such as their checks and promissory bills (or Yakusoku 
Tegata in Japanese). Japanese firms tend to depend on receipts and payments in the 
settlements accounting of main banks for their cash flow (Aoki et al., 1994). Therefore, main 
banks can hold a financial position with respect to their client firms to check their cash flow. 
Close relationships between main banks and their client firms are incentives for main 
banks to maintain their relationships. Sheard (1994) summarize the various business benefits 
of main banks, such as corporate bank deposit, bond issues, co-underwriter, and foreign 
exchange transactions2. In addition, main banks address large shares of foreign exchange 
business of clients’ firms because clients maintain settlement accounts with main banks (Aoki 
et al., 1994). 
On the other hand, main banks bear special obligation and responsibility when their 
client firms face financial distress (Sheard, 1994). Therefore, close relationships between 
banks and clients discourage banks from pursuing risky attitudes (Weistein and Yafeh, 1998). 
To maintain close relationships among banks and their clients, main banks extend the debt 
contracts of client firms to multiple beneficial business relationships. In this case, client firms 
are willing to submit their information to main banks, which is regarded as voluntary 
disclosure. If the firms give the main banks information related to their potential troubles, the 
main bank cannot abandon their duties and responsibilities (Aoki et al., 1994). Main banks 
play an important role of managing the financial position of client firms3. 
 
                                                 
2 For example, main banks take a monotonic position when the client firms decide to issue 
their bonds. 
3 The roles of main banks differ based on financial conditions. Sheard (1994) summarizes 
their roles in the phase of financial distress of their client firms and shows the main banks’ 
involvement in restructuring listed firms. 
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Main Bank System and Accounting Conservatism 
This paper analyzes the relationship between accounting conservatism and main banks 
in Japan. There are two main views of the relationship between main banks and accounting 
conservatism. One view is that main banks, being the largest lenders, tend to be more risk 
averse than other equity owners, because they need to maintain close ties with their client 
firms (Weistein and Yafeh, 1998). In principle, lenders are interested in protecting their debt 
by adopting conservatism accounting (Watts, 2003a). Thus, these close relationships between 
the banks and the firms would urge them to demand accounting conservatism. 
The other view is that the main bank can moderate accounting conservatism, which is 
based on two paths. First, the Japanese main bank system can moderate principal-agent 
problems and the conflicts between lenders and shareholders. In addition, conflicts stemming 
from the asymmetric payoff are relatively small for main banks because the banks have a 
significant share of their own clients. Second, the central source of these agency problems is 
information asymmetry among lenders and borrowers4. Main bank systems moderate agency 
problems arising from asymmetric information between creditors and firms (Hoshi et al., 
1990). Banks gather enough private information on the client firms by using the lending 
relationship or “relational debt” (David et al., 2008; O’Brien et al., 2014). The main bank is 
well informed about the client firms because of their duty and responsibility to be well 
informed. Thus, according to this view, main banks do not demand accounting conservatism. 
To clarify the two possibilities, we consider the potential difference between main 
banks and commercial banks when it comes to their demand for conservative accounting. The 
                                                 
4 In fact, Erkens et al. (2014) point out that “Borrower-lender information asymmetry is 
central to the agency problem of debt and, therefore, any monitoring mechanism that is 




former view suggests that the risk averse attitude of banks would promote the demand for 
conservative accounting. However, main banks would have several mechanisms to mitigate 
agency problems arising from debt contracts, which is different from the case of commercial 
banks. First, as Prowse (1990) mentioned, main banks are large equity holders and do not 
have concerns about asymmetric downside risk as lenders. Second, the main banks carefully 
monitor the client firms through their lending activities and by observing accounting 
settlements for both, their own interest and the other lenders’ interests, as in the 
abovementioned second point of view5. Considering these two points, we speculate that main 
banks may play substitute roles of accounting conservatism. Therefore, we construct the 
following hypothesis related to accounting conservatism. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Firms that have relationships with main banks adopt less conservative 
accounting than firms that do not have relationships with main banks. 
 
Data and Estimation Measure 
Sample Selection and Variables 
We select data from non-financial firms listed in the Japanese stock exchange from 2007 
to 2014 to analyze the relationship between non-financial listed firms and main banks. We 
drop all financial firms because we are interested in the relationships between main banks and 
client firms. The financial accounting data and corporate governance data including those on 
main banks are collected from the Nikkei Needs database, such as financial data and 
corporate governance evaluation system (CGES) data. To remove outliers, we drop the top or 
bottom 1% of market value deflated earnings. Our selected sample consists of 25,505 firm–
                                                 





We adopt a dummy variable (Main Bank Dummy or MBD) to analyze whether the main 
bank affects accounting conservatism or not. MBD equals 1 if the proportion of the largest 
lenders’ shareholdings is positive and 0 otherwise. In addition, there might be a possibility 
that commercial banks that do not have stakes of client firms can take on a role to effectively 
monitor their client firms. Following a long-term relationship between main banks and client 
firms, banks without stakes in their client firms may not demand accounting conservatism. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
We define accounting conservatism as the asymmetric loss recognition coefficient 
model through Equation (1), following Basu (1997). Earningsi,t = 𝛼𝛼0 + β1DRi,t + β2Reti,t + β3Reti,t ∗ DRi,t + IDi,t + εi,t       (1) 
 
Where: Earningsi,t = Net income of firm i in fiscal year t divided by the beginning of the fiscal year 
market value of equity; Reti,t = Stock returns of firm i in fiscal year t over the fiscal year; DRi,t = An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if Ret is negative and 0 otherwise; 
 
 We define three variables namely, Earnings, Ret, and DR, following Shuto and Takada 
(2010). In Equation (1), β2 captures and measures the timeliness of earnings with respect to 
good news and β3 captures accounting conservatism in terms of the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings. 
To analyze our empirical hypothesis, we expand the Basu model to incorporate the 
effect of both main bank relationships and bank lending. We estimate Equation (2) as 
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follows: Earningsi,t = 𝛼𝛼0 + β1DRi,t + β2Bank Relationi,t−1 + β3DRi,t ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 
 +β4Reti,t + β5Reti,t ∗ DRi,t + β6Reti,t ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 
 +β7Reti,t ∗ DRi,t ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 + IDi,t + εi,t       (2) 
 
Where: Bank Relationi,t−1 = Main Bank Dummy (MBDi,t−1 ) or Bank Lendingi,t−1; MBDi,t−1 = An indicator variable is equal to 1 if the proportion of main bank shareholdings of 
firm j at the end of year t-1 are positive, otherwise it is 0; Bank Lendingi,t−1 = The sum of all bank loans divided by the market value of firm j at the 
end of year t-1; IDi,t−1 = Industry fixed effects. 
 
The other variables are defined in the same way as in Equation (1). If the coefficient β7 
is negative, firms with main bank relations (MBD) or Bank Lending have lower asymmetric 
loss recognition than firms without them. Our estimations adopt cluster standard errors at the 
firm and year levels to control for residual dependence. 
Next, we implement several control variables related to accounting conservatism. 
These variables are Market to Book ratio (MTB), financial leverage (Leverage), firm size 
(MV), and the percentage of CEO ownership (CEO Ownership). MTB is adopted to control 
for the effects of the future asymmetric timelines of equity value (Roychowdhury and Watts, 
2007). Financial leverage (Leverage) is controlled for the demand of accounting conservatism 
by debt holders. In addition, firm size (MV) is also controlled because it is negatively 
correlated with asymmetric timeliness of earnings (LaFond and Watts, 2008). Finally, CEO 
ownership is controlled to capture agency problems between shareholders and managers 
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(LaFond and Roychouwdhury, 2008). Our model adds several control variables into the Basu 
model as follows. Earningsi,t = 𝛼𝛼0 + β1DRi,t + β2MDi,t−1 + β3DRi,t ∗ MDi,t−1 
 +β4Reti,t + β5Reti,t ∗ DRi,t + β6Reti,t ∗ MDi,t−1 
 +β7Retit ∗ DRit ∗ MDi,t−1 + βiControli,t−1 + βiDRit ∗ Controli,t−1 
 +βiRetit ∗ Controli,t−1 + βiRetit ∗ DRit ∗ Controli,t−1 + IDit + εit             (3) 
 Earningsi,t = 𝛼𝛼0 + β1DRi,t + γ2Bank Lendingi,t−1 + γ3DRi,t ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1 
 +β4Reti,t + β5Reti,t ∗ DRi,t + γ6Reti,t ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1 
 +γ7Retit ∗ DRit ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1 + βiControli,t−1 + βiDRit ∗ Controli,t−1 
 +βiRetit ∗ Controli,t−1 + βiRetit ∗ DRit ∗ Controli,t−1 + IDit + εit                (4) 
 




Our descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, and the sample are reported in Panels 
A and B in Table 1. In Panel A, the average of earnings is 0.034, which is smaller than the 
average earnings of U.S. firms as reported by Erkens et al. (2014). The mean of stock returns 
(RET) indicates -0.015 which suggests that Japanese firms suffered from global financial 
crisis. The mean of DR (negative return dummy) also occupies more than 0.5 which shows 
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the same tendency as seen in previous studies such as Shuto and Takada (2010). We find 
8,849 firm–year observations (about 35.3 %) which have relationships with main banks. It 
appears that these relationships are still maintained for more than 1/3 of the total number of 
Japanese listed firms. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 1 goes about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
As for Pearson’s correlation matrix in Panel B of Table 1, we can find that earnings 
are positively correlated with RET and negatively with DR. This implies that reported 
earnings include a part of information that is consistent with previous studies such as Basu 
(1997) and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008). In addition, bank lending dummy is 
negatively correlated with MBD. This implies that there are conflicts among banks as lenders 
and shareholders. 
We compare the differences between sample firms with and without MBD. Panel C of 
Table 1 reports the results of the mean difference t test. In Panel C, we find that firms with 
MBD have significantly higher earnings, which is a higher indicator of negative stock returns 
(DR). This suggests that conservatism accounting might be mitigated in firms with MBD. In 
addition, we also find higher bank lending ratio and higher leverage. These means that firms 
with MBD tend to rely on debt financing more than firms without MBD. We also find that 
MTB and firm size with MBD are significantly lower, implying that firms with lower growth 
opportunities and smaller sizes tend to be monitored by main banks. Finally, CEO ownership 
is significantly lower for firms with MBD. This means that the main bank would be helpful to 





We first test whether MBD firms adopt less conservative accounting than non-MBD 
firms or not, using whole samples of our analysis. This result is reported in Table 2, which 
aims to reveal whether or not the degree of accounting conservatism is differently observed 
between MBD and non-MBD firms. Our estimated models adopt cluster standard errors at the 
firm and year levels to control for residual dependence. To remove outliers, we drop the top 
1% of the absolute standardized residuals. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 2 goes about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
 In Table 2, we find that the coefficient (β5) is significantly positive and accounting 
conservatism is observed for all six estimated models. As for the role of main banks, we find 
that the coefficient of MBD (β7) is significantly negative in Models (1), (2), and (3). This 
implies that firms with MBD use less accounting conservatism than firms without, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, Table 2 shows that the coefficient of bank 
lending relationship (γ7) is not significant in Models (4), (5), and (6). 
 Next, we check whether or not bank lending relationships are negative to accounting 
conservatism using the alternative models in Table 3. First, we insert both MBD and Bank 
Lending into the estimation models to adopt all samples in Models (1), (2), and (3). 
Furthermore, we focus on firms with bank lending relationships in Models (4), (5), and (6) to 
check the robustness of our results. Using Table 3, we also find that the coefficient (β5) is 
significantly positive, implying accounting conservatism for not only all firms, but also firms 
with bank lending relationships. We can find that coefficient (β7) is also significant and 
negative in all models, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. The coefficient (γ7) is not 
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significant to accounting conservatism. Therefore, we can conclude that main banks, as both 
lenders and shareholders, matter for decreasing accounting conservatism. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 3 goes about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Robustness of Results 
To control for the impact of covariates on the dependent variable, we use a propensity 
score matching (PSM) to examine the effectiveness of main bank relationships. We adopt 
MTB as a proxy for the understatement of net assets. We include financial leverage 
(Leverage) to control for demand for conservatism as debt holders. Firm size is controlled by 
the logarithm of total assets (ln(Assets)). We adopt stock return volatility (Volatility) to 
control for firm risk. We measure the amount of free cash-flow (Free Cash) as cash flow 
from operating activities and investing activities divided by total assets. Bank lending (Bank 
Lending) is the sum of all bank loans divided by the market value of the firm (O’Brien et al., 
2014). 
 In Table 4, we show the results of the logit models to derive the PSM. The dependent 
variables is the dummy of MBD firms. This tables indicates that MBD firms tend to be 
smaller and have higher debt ratio than non-MBD firms. A large amount of main bank 
lending is also investigated in MBD firms. In addition, free cash flow is less used for MBD 
firms, implying that main bank monitors help reduce managerial free cash flow. Overall, the 
controlling variables might be potentially important factors. 
------------------------------------------------ 





To control for impact of covariates on the dependent variable, we use PSM. The final 
sample of score matching is 16,492 firm–year observations, which consist of 8,246 from 
MBD firms and 8,246 from non-MBD firms. Using PSM, we confirm the robustness of our 
results in Table 5. In Table 5, the negative coefficient β7 is also significant and negative, 
supporting Hypothesis 1. We confirm the supporting evidence that lower asymmetric 
timelines arise from both gain and loss recognition in Table 5. Therefore, we can conclude 
that our estimated results are robust after using the PSM method. 
------------------------------------------------ 
Table 5 goes about here 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In a market-oriented economy like the U.S., the process of monitoring through lending 
mitigates lenders’ demand for accounting conservatism (Erkens et al., 2014). On the other 
hand, no previous study reveals the relationship between accounting conservatism and 
monitoring by lending relationships, which would be a typical analogy for main bank systems 
in the bank-dominated corporate governance system in Japan. Therefore, our research 
question is to clarify whether or not main bank monitoring would substitute accounting 
conservatism. To investigate this, we examine how relationships with main banks influence 
the demand for conservative accounting in Japanese corporations. 
We empirically reveal that firms with relationships with main banks adopt less 
conservative accounting. The robustness of our findings is confirmed by the PSM method. 
This is due to the effective monitoring of main banks, which can reduce information 
asymmetry and agency problems. Main banks can gather private information on borrowing 
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firms through their monitoring activity (Hoshi et al., 1991). Different from market-oriented 
system like in the U.S., Japanese main banks, as both lenders and shareholders, do not face 
asymmetric payoff problems, and do not necessarily demand accounting conservatism. This 
finding would be interpreted to mean that main banks play a role in effective monitoring and 
do not demand conservative accounting. 
We focus on whether or not main banks and banks with only lending relationships 
demand accounting conservatism. From the view of lenders, they might demand accounting 
conservatism to mitigate agency problems. We cannot gain significant results for firms 
connected to commercial banks without stakes. This implies that commercial banks in Japan 
might not adopt less accounting conservatism, different from main banks. Main banks play 
the role of monitors from the viewpoint of both, lenders and shareholders, which differs from 
commercial banks without stakes. Therefore, monitoring of banks which only have lending 
relationships does not substitute for conservative accounting in a bank-dominated economy. 
This paper makes several contributions. First, our findings develop the role of agency 
theory related to bank monitoring mechanisms. Our findings reveal that monitoring of main 
banks would be strong enough to substitute for accounting conservatism, but the other 
lending banks may demand accounting conservatism because their monitoring does not have 
enough to substitute for accounting conservatism. This conclusion can contribute to 
understanding who demands accounting conservatism to mitigate agency problems in bank-
dominated corporate governance systems like in Japan. Second, we also provide empirical 
evidence to contribute banking literature such as main banks and relationship banking. Our 
findings suggest that relationship banking can gather private information on borrowers using 
their lending technology. This suggests that the role of main banks, in being delegated 
monitors, is supported by the close relationship between them and their client firms using 
relationship banking techniques. 
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There are several limitations in our study. First, our study only focuses on the role of 
main banks in monitoring large Japanese listed firms. Smaller firms are more likely to depend 
on their banking relationships because they face difficulties in raising capital through 
financial markets. Thus, monitoring activity of lending banks would be stronger for these 
relatively smaller client firms, and substitute for accounting conservatism. Thus, the potential 
avenue for future research is to examine the relationship between main banks or lending 
banks and conservative accounting in smaller and medium sized firms. Second, the 
implication of this paper cannot be applied to large corporations in other countries because 
corporate governance features are different among different national bundles (Zattoni et al., 
2009). Thus, there might be possibilities that relationship banking would not play sufficient 
substitute roles for accounting conservatism in other countries. To understand this, our future 
task would be to enlarge our knowledge of various corporate governance mechanisms in 
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Net income divided by the beginning of fiscal year market value of 
equity 
DR 
Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if Stock returns (Ret) are 
negative, and 0 otherwise 
Ret Stock returns over the fiscal year 
MBD 
It is equal to 1 if the proportion of main bank shareholdings are 
positive, otherwise it is 0 
Bank Lending The sum of all bank loans divided by the market value of the firm 
MTB The market value divided by book value of capital of the firm 
Leverage The sum of debt divided by total assets 
Firm Size Logarithm of the market value of the firm 
CEO Ownership The percentage of CEO ownership 
Ln(Assets) Logarithm of total assets 
Volatility Stock volatility during three years 
Volatility^2 Square of stock volatility (Volatility) during three years 
Free Cash 
Cash flows from operating activities and investing activities divided 




Panel A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: N= 25,055. Descriptive statistics are based on the data from non-financial firms listed 
at the Japanese stock exchange from 2007 to 2014. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Panel B. Correlation Coefficients 
 
Notes: N= 25,055. See Appendix A for variable definitions. * indicate significance at the 5% 
level. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Earnings 0.033 0.140 0.016 0.052 0.092
DR 0.525 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000
Ret -0.020 0.173 -0.102 -0.008 0.069
MBD 0.353 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000
Bank Lending 0.560 1.093 0.000 0.160 0.674
Leverage 49.842 20.835 33.580 50.600 66.080
MTB 1.526 7.406 0.603 0.919 1.505
CEO Ownership 7.050 12.219 0.072 0.768 8.869
Firm Size 103393 507426 3867.0 10959.0 40295.0
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1. Earnings
2. DR -0.259 *
3. Ret 0.334 * -0.704 *
4. MBD 0.027 * 0.020 * 0.001
5. Bank Lending -0.059 * -0.063 * 0.077 * 0.247 *
6.Leverage -0.009 0.035 * -0.032 * 0.280 * 0.495 *
7. MTB -0.017 * 0.044 * -0.071 * -0.030 * -0.022 * 0.060 *
8. CEO Ownership -0.007 0.018 * -0.038 * -0.113 * 0.026 * -0.050 * 0.035 *
9. Firm Size 0.017 * 0.006 -0.010 -0.077 * -0.069 * 0.020 * 0.013 * -0.091 *
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Panel C. Mean Difference between MBD and Non-MBD 
 
Notes: N= 25,055. See Appendix A for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate 















Earnings 0.030 0.038 -0.008 ***
DR 0.517 0.538 -0.021 **
Ret -0.021 -0.020 0.000
Bank Lending 0.361 0.925 -0.564 ***
Leverage 45.533 57.734 -12.201 ***
MTB 1.691 1.223 0.467 ***
CEO Ownership 8.070 5.181 2.889 ***






Table 2: Conservatism and Main Bank Relation (All data) Earningsi,t = 𝛼𝛼0 + β1DRi,t + β2Bank Relationi,t−1 + β3DRi,t ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 
 +β4Reti,t + β5Reti,t ∗ DRi,t + β6Reti,t ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 
 +β7Retit ∗ DRit ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 + βiControli,t−1 + βiDRit ∗ Controli,t−1 
 +βiRetit ∗ Controli,t−1 + βiRetit ∗ DRit ∗ Controli,t−1 + IDit + εit     (3) Earningsi,t = 𝛼𝛼0 + β1DRi,t + γ2Bank Lendingi,t−1 + γ3DRi,t ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1 
 +β4Reti,t + β5Reti,t ∗ DRi,t + γ6Reti,t ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1 
 +γ7Retit ∗ DRit ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1 + βiControli,t−1 + βiDRit ∗ Controli,t−1 
 +βiRetit ∗ Controli,t−1 + βiRetit ∗ DRit ∗ Controli,t−1 + IDit + εit      (4) 
 
 
This table presents the results of a regression model that examines the relationship between a main 
bank and accounting conservatism using the Basu model. Estimated data is based on all samples. We 
cluster standard errors at the firm and year levels. T-values are presented in parentheses. The results 
of industry dummies and control variables are not reported. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DR β1 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.024 * -0.023 *  
(-1.35) (-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.17) (-2.38) (-2.39)
MBD β2 0.006 + 0.006 + 0.005
(1.72) (1.83) (1.56)
MBD β3 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009
*DR (-1.05) (-1.36) (-1.34)
Return β4 0.112 *** -0.006 -0.006 0.126 *** -0.007 -0.007
(7.84) (-0.13) (-0.12) (9.22) (-0.13) (-0.14)
DR*Return β5 0.206 *** 0.247 *** 0.250 *** 0.166 *** 0.251 *** 0.259 ***
(3.62) (5.21) (5.79) (3.67) (3.90) (4.45)
MBD β6 0.090 + 0.054 0.048
*Return (1.89) (1.26) (1.11)
MBD β7 -0.109 * -0.132 ** -0.120 *  
*DR*Return (-2.01) (-2.71) (-2.45)
Bank Lending γ2 -0.003 -0.006 * -0.006 +  
(-1.07) (-2.06) (-1.89)
Bank Lending γ3 -0.016 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 ***
*DR (-4.75) (-5.15) (-5.57)
Bank Lending γ6 0.008 -0.012 -0.009
*Return (0.59) (-0.70) (-0.53)
Bank Lending γ7 0.054 0.051 0.044
*DR*Return (1.09) (0.88) (0.78)
ID Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 25055 25055 25055 25055 25055 25055
Ajusted R2 0.122 0.132 0.130 0.140 0.150 0.146
F 154.00 *** 84.94 *** 109.30 *** 166.00 *** 88.63 *** 113.20 ***
MBD Only Bank Lending Only
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Table 3: Conservatism and Main Bank Relationship Earningsi,t = 𝛼𝛼0 + β1DRi,t + β2Bank Relationi,t−1 + β3DRi,t ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 
 +β4Reti,t + β5Reti,t ∗ DRi,t + β6Reti,t ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 
            +β7Retit ∗ DRit ∗ Bank Relationi,t−1 + γ2Bank Lendingi,t−1 
           +γ3DRi,t ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1  + γ6Reti,t ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1 
 +γ7Retit ∗ DRit ∗ Bank Lendingi,t−1 + βiControli,t−1 + βiDRit ∗ Controli,t−1 
 +βiRetit ∗ Controli,t−1 + βiRetit ∗ DRit ∗ Controli,t−1 + IDit + εit 
 
 
This table presents the results of a regression model that examines the relationship between a main 
bank and accounting conservatism using the Basu model. Estimated data is based on all firms in 
Models (1)-(3) and firms with bank lending relationships in Models (4)-(6). We cluster the standard 
errors at the firm and year levels. T-values are presented in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. The results of industry dummies and control variables are not reported. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and the 5% levels. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DR β1 -0.008 -0.023 * -0.023 *  0.004 -0.013 -0.011
(-1.07) (-2.21) (-2.21) (0.56) (-0.73) (-0.64)
MBD β2 0.009 ** 0.008 * 0.006 *  0.011 ** 0.010 ** 0.008 *  
(2.90) (2.46) (2.06) (3.16) (2.93) (2.48)
MBD β3 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
*DR (0.24) (-0.58) (-0.57) (-1.09) (-1.29) (-1.29)
Return β4 0.110 *** -0.019 -0.016 0.185 *** 0.049 0.055
(9.66) (-0.38) (-0.33) (19.32) (0.52) (0.57)
DR*Return β5 0.188 *** 0.273 *** 0.276 *** 0.138 *** 0.257 ** 0.269 ** 
(4.37) (4.22) (4.75) (3.64) (2.77) (2.85)
MBD β6 0.097 * 0.075 * 0.064 +  0.041 0.046 0.035
*Return (2.56) (2.15) (1.84) (1.00) (1.39) (1.13)
MBD β7 -0.131 ** -0.151 *** -0.131 *** -0.097 * -0.121 ** -0.101 *  
*DR*Return (-3.00) (-4.10) (-3.51) (-1.96) (-2.92) (-2.47)
Bank Lending γ2 -0.005 -0.007 * -0.006 *  -0.005 -0.007 * -0.007 *  
(-1.57) (-2.27) (-2.04) (-1.52) (-2.37) (-2.08)
Bank Lending γ3 -0.016 *** -0.020 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 *** -0.021 *** -0.021 ***
*DR (-4.70) (-5.13) (-5.56) (-5.18) (-4.66) (-4.88)
Bank Lending γ6 0.003 -0.015 -0.012 -0.009 -0.019 -0.014
*Return (0.28) (-0.99) (-0.76) (-0.78) (-1.12) (-0.82)
Bank Lending γ7 0.060 0.056 0.048 0.067 0.064 0.055
*DR*Return (1.18) (0.95) (0.84) (1.24) (0.98) (0.86)
ID Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Control No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 25055 25055 25055 16410 16410 16410
Ajusted R2 0.143 0.152 0.148 0.161 0.168 0.163
F 136.30 *** 81.64 *** 99.87 *** 104.20 *** 60.54 *** 74.27 ***
Bank Lending OnlyAll Data
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Table 4: Logit Models Predicting on MBD 
 
This table presents the estimated results of a logit model to reveal the determinants of the main bank 
relationship. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable definitions. The 
results of industry dummies and year dummies are not reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 





















Free Cash -2.213 ***
(-14.67)










Table 5: Conservatism and Main Bank Relationships (Using propensity-matched samples) 
 
This table presents the results of a regression model that examines the relationship between a main 
bank and accounting conservatism using the Basu model. Estimated data is based on all samples. T-
values are presented in parentheses. See Appendix A for variable definitions. The results of industry 
dummies and control variables are not reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1% 
and 5% levels. 
(1) (2)






β4 0.191 *** 0.196 ***
(6.48) (6.63)








Ajusted R2 0.139 0.141
F 141.2 *** 288.7 ***
